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	<title>Comments on: Theosis among some Anglicans, part 1</title>
	<link>http://www.thelandofunlikeness.com/2007/08/12/theosis-among-some-anglicans-part-1/</link>
	<description>Catholic Anglican Reflections on Theology and Culture</description>
	<pubDate>Thu, 04 Dec 2008 08:23:05 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Scott</title>
		<link>http://www.thelandofunlikeness.com/2007/08/12/theosis-among-some-anglicans-part-1/#comment-243</link>
		<dc:creator>Scott</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Aug 2007 16:37:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.thelandofunlikeness.com/2007/08/12/theosis-among-some-anglicans-part-1/#comment-243</guid>
		<description>Thanks for that.

As an aside, given that Aquinas follows Aristotle on the superiority/nobility of speculative knowledge (knowledge for its own sake--what you say as 'beauty for the sake of beauty') over practical knowledge (e.g. 'knowing beauty for the sake of knowing the sunset'). I'd still say that for Aquinas faith does have conclusions (The second person of the Trinity became incarnate; God is Triune; God is love, etc.), it is just that reason cannot provide premises that necessarily have a conclusion that is identical to the conclusion delivered by faith. And by reason, here we are talking about syllogisms which naturally cause in us scientific knowledge. For Aquinas, if A is B, and B is C, it necessarily causes us to conclude that A is C. We have no 'choice' in the matter. And when it comes to faith, this natural/automatic process doesn't work successfully. There is no syllogism or series of syllogisms that will have conclusions, such as God is a Trinity, that naturally/necessarily follow from the premises.

Anyways, thanks for the Hooker post; he's someone I'd like to learn more about if time would ever allow it. Tempus edax!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for that.</p>
<p>As an aside, given that Aquinas follows Aristotle on the superiority/nobility of speculative knowledge (knowledge for its own sake&#8211;what you say as &#8216;beauty for the sake of beauty&#8217;) over practical knowledge (e.g. &#8216;knowing beauty for the sake of knowing the sunset&#8217;). I&#8217;d still say that for Aquinas faith does have conclusions (The second person of the Trinity became incarnate; God is Triune; God is love, etc.), it is just that reason cannot provide premises that necessarily have a conclusion that is identical to the conclusion delivered by faith. And by reason, here we are talking about syllogisms which naturally cause in us scientific knowledge. For Aquinas, if A is B, and B is C, it necessarily causes us to conclude that A is C. We have no &#8216;choice&#8217; in the matter. And when it comes to faith, this natural/automatic process doesn&#8217;t work successfully. There is no syllogism or series of syllogisms that will have conclusions, such as God is a Trinity, that naturally/necessarily follow from the premises.</p>
<p>Anyways, thanks for the Hooker post; he&#8217;s someone I&#8217;d like to learn more about if time would ever allow it. Tempus edax!</p>
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		<title>By: DWM</title>
		<link>http://www.thelandofunlikeness.com/2007/08/12/theosis-among-some-anglicans-part-1/#comment-242</link>
		<dc:creator>DWM</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Aug 2007 15:03:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.thelandofunlikeness.com/2007/08/12/theosis-among-some-anglicans-part-1/#comment-242</guid>
		<description>Scott, good question about Hooker's notion of the relation of reason to grace and faith, but not one I'm sure I can answer concisely - especially considering scary and antiquated language of the 17th c. is - but let me try my hand at it. I make drawing fun!

First, I don't have book III, in whioh, accoridng to Newey, Hooker does most of his work on Reason. I think Newey's point, however, is that humans have a natural capacity to reason, but this aptitude is a passive one, an aptitudo passiva, in that it has a zero contribution in our participation with Christ. So, while reason can operate in the absence of direct "illumination", it needs grace for that illumination, particularly in operations and inquiries into Scripture. You can already see Hooker's emphasis on participation as an active engagement for the human. This illumination is less alien and more akin to wisdom, imparted wisdom yes, but still something that requires "the help of natural discourse and reason" (III, viii, 11, p. 374). 
Rowan Williams in his article "Philosopher, Anglican, Contemporary" (in &lt;em&gt;Anglican Identities&lt;/em&gt; also draws this comparison between reason and wisdom when he calls Hooker a sapiential theologian. Hooker's common theme of "Law" invokes the concept of Sophia in describing the actions of God (p. 41). Hooker, or at least Williams reading of Hooker, is faithful to the analogia entis: "If we want to talk of God acting so as to bring about some end, we have to suppose that the divine activity too is 'law-like'; and, since God cannot be limited or conditioned by any other agency, it is what God is that determines (limits) how God acts." How we, or let's say our reason, grasps the actions of God, depends on the context or environment in which we encounter those actions. As such, we need to be careful about how absolute our determinations of those actions get - Hooker advises silence! But in those cases where we're determined to break our silence, we need to consider our end as humans - we're destined to know beauty for beauty's sake, goodness for goodness's sake, etc.. - and recognize that our growth in wisdom about these things we increase as the rest of our spiritual capacities increase. He gives no formulaic prescriptions for this growth, but urges a contemplative and, above all, sacramental approach - see Newey's article here for the emphasis on the sacramental qua participation in God's life through Christ.
So, to answer you question - thick as it is - I would have to conclude that for Hooker faith is about as likely to deliver "conclusion" as the sacraments are to do the same. The language is simply not there in Hooker to talk about conclusions in regard to faith and such. Human reason will certainly give conclusion, although Hooker is likely to chasten our reliance on them. Reason is not there to coerce conclusion out of the sacraments. Rather, faith is there to conform reason and in many cases to silence it. Hooker is fairly conservative, as Williams points out. He seems more content to allow the actions of God to work themselves out in the contemplative and sacramental life of the church than to give systematic accounts of those actions.
But in regard to your statement: "reason is not perfected by faith, b/c even after faith delivers its conclusions, reason cannot give a demonstrative account of these conclusions–otherwise ‘faith would not merit salvation’ and so faith would be denigrated" if we were to change "conclusions" to "illumination" then I think you and Hooker would be close, especially as he utilizes a fair amount of Aquinas.
Hope that helps</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Scott, good question about Hooker&#8217;s notion of the relation of reason to grace and faith, but not one I&#8217;m sure I can answer concisely - especially considering scary and antiquated language of the 17th c. is - but let me try my hand at it. I make drawing fun!</p>
<p>First, I don&#8217;t have book III, in whioh, accoridng to Newey, Hooker does most of his work on Reason. I think Newey&#8217;s point, however, is that humans have a natural capacity to reason, but this aptitude is a passive one, an aptitudo passiva, in that it has a zero contribution in our participation with Christ. So, while reason can operate in the absence of direct &#8220;illumination&#8221;, it needs grace for that illumination, particularly in operations and inquiries into Scripture. You can already see Hooker&#8217;s emphasis on participation as an active engagement for the human. This illumination is less alien and more akin to wisdom, imparted wisdom yes, but still something that requires &#8220;the help of natural discourse and reason&#8221; (III, viii, 11, p. 374).<br />
Rowan Williams in his article &#8220;Philosopher, Anglican, Contemporary&#8221; (in <em>Anglican Identities</em> also draws this comparison between reason and wisdom when he calls Hooker a sapiential theologian. Hooker&#8217;s common theme of &#8220;Law&#8221; invokes the concept of Sophia in describing the actions of God (p. 41). Hooker, or at least Williams reading of Hooker, is faithful to the analogia entis: &#8220;If we want to talk of God acting so as to bring about some end, we have to suppose that the divine activity too is &#8216;law-like&#8217;; and, since God cannot be limited or conditioned by any other agency, it is what God is that determines (limits) how God acts.&#8221; How we, or let&#8217;s say our reason, grasps the actions of God, depends on the context or environment in which we encounter those actions. As such, we need to be careful about how absolute our determinations of those actions get - Hooker advises silence! But in those cases where we&#8217;re determined to break our silence, we need to consider our end as humans - we&#8217;re destined to know beauty for beauty&#8217;s sake, goodness for goodness&#8217;s sake, etc.. - and recognize that our growth in wisdom about these things we increase as the rest of our spiritual capacities increase. He gives no formulaic prescriptions for this growth, but urges a contemplative and, above all, sacramental approach - see Newey&#8217;s article here for the emphasis on the sacramental qua participation in God&#8217;s life through Christ.<br />
So, to answer you question - thick as it is - I would have to conclude that for Hooker faith is about as likely to deliver &#8220;conclusion&#8221; as the sacraments are to do the same. The language is simply not there in Hooker to talk about conclusions in regard to faith and such. Human reason will certainly give conclusion, although Hooker is likely to chasten our reliance on them. Reason is not there to coerce conclusion out of the sacraments. Rather, faith is there to conform reason and in many cases to silence it. Hooker is fairly conservative, as Williams points out. He seems more content to allow the actions of God to work themselves out in the contemplative and sacramental life of the church than to give systematic accounts of those actions.<br />
But in regard to your statement: &#8220;reason is not perfected by faith, b/c even after faith delivers its conclusions, reason cannot give a demonstrative account of these conclusions–otherwise ‘faith would not merit salvation’ and so faith would be denigrated&#8221; if we were to change &#8220;conclusions&#8221; to &#8220;illumination&#8221; then I think you and Hooker would be close, especially as he utilizes a fair amount of Aquinas.<br />
Hope that helps</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Scott</title>
		<link>http://www.thelandofunlikeness.com/2007/08/12/theosis-among-some-anglicans-part-1/#comment-241</link>
		<dc:creator>Scott</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Aug 2007 11:54:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.thelandofunlikeness.com/2007/08/12/theosis-among-some-anglicans-part-1/#comment-241</guid>
		<description>Is the analogy btwn.: faith is to reason as grace is to nature, basically this: the former is supernatural (i.e. new creation) and not a given for the creature (i.e. old nature), and the latter is constitutive of the old nature. So, the former is an new power given to the believer which is not acquired, but is infused; the difference is that the former can be achieved by the effort of the creature, and the latter is achieved only by means of God's own action. So, if faith perfects reason, this means faith brings about conclusions (e.g. God is Triune, God is incarnate in Christ) that natural reason could not achieve by itself. A question then is this, once faith delivers its conclusions, can reason contemplate these and in turn provide an account or explanation of the conclusions of faith? Henry of Ghent seems to say 'yes'--natural reason can be perfected by faith and in turn give an acct. of the conclusions of faith that are demonstrative; whereas Aquinas seems to say 'no', reason is not perfected by faith, b/c even after faith delivers its conclusions, reason cannot give a demonstrative account of these conclusions--otherwise 'faith would not merit salvation' and so faith would be denigrated. Gilles Emery discusses this a bit in his 'Aquinas on the Trinity' book publ. by Ave Maria Press, though I'm sure it's also in his newer Oxford Univ. Press version of the book, 'Aquinas's Trinitarian Theology'....</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Is the analogy btwn.: faith is to reason as grace is to nature, basically this: the former is supernatural (i.e. new creation) and not a given for the creature (i.e. old nature), and the latter is constitutive of the old nature. So, the former is an new power given to the believer which is not acquired, but is infused; the difference is that the former can be achieved by the effort of the creature, and the latter is achieved only by means of God&#8217;s own action. So, if faith perfects reason, this means faith brings about conclusions (e.g. God is Triune, God is incarnate in Christ) that natural reason could not achieve by itself. A question then is this, once faith delivers its conclusions, can reason contemplate these and in turn provide an account or explanation of the conclusions of faith? Henry of Ghent seems to say &#8216;yes&#8217;&#8211;natural reason can be perfected by faith and in turn give an acct. of the conclusions of faith that are demonstrative; whereas Aquinas seems to say &#8216;no&#8217;, reason is not perfected by faith, b/c even after faith delivers its conclusions, reason cannot give a demonstrative account of these conclusions&#8211;otherwise &#8216;faith would not merit salvation&#8217; and so faith would be denigrated. Gilles Emery discusses this a bit in his &#8216;Aquinas on the Trinity&#8217; book publ. by Ave Maria Press, though I&#8217;m sure it&#8217;s also in his newer Oxford Univ. Press version of the book, &#8216;Aquinas&#8217;s Trinitarian Theology&#8217;&#8230;.</p>
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