If the Enlightenment and subsequent periods of modernity have done anything to alter what it means to be human, they have set humanity at a distance from the world, positing a radical degree of separation between the created order and Aristotle’s rational animals. Where God factors into this rift, and how one structures the dialogue between Philosophy and Theology, depends largely on how one schematizes God in relation to Being. It was Hans Urs von Balthasar who adroitly drew out the ramification of the human mind’s prodigality when he said, “[T]he human person himself would stand as the synthetic element, not only between [Church and world/Faith and Reason], but secretly above both.”1
Yet, while the debates over modernity and its theological consequences drew on, the distance between humanity and world stretched ever wider, matched only by modernity’s maw, engulfing the world quicker than Christianity could respond and, some would argue, in ways Christian scholars and clergy didn’t know how to respond to. Christian (sub)culture was born, an enclave of fear of and loathing for the secular, an a-theism which Christian subculture bore to life and gave authenticity and integrity to the more it removed itself form the world.
The frequently brutal dismissal of the Church’s authority also in worldly matters of politics, of the planning of the world, and above all in matters of the spirit and science, does indeed correspond in part to an increasing falling away of the educated and of the masses from the Christian faith, but in part also to a process (acknowledged and justified by the Church herself) in which the natural orders and areas of knowledge assume autonomy, as was demanded by the Vatican Council itself in clear distinction between the natural and supernatural orders: duplex ordo cognitionis, proprio objecto, propria methodo.
In the most recent Books & Culture, and his new book Resounding Truth, Jeremy Begbie argues that, while the Christian subculture removed itself from the world, the world is not so easily shaken off, as if it were an old coat or bad dream. In fact, at the heart of the Christian truth is the deep understanding of the world as a gratuitous and ex nihilo “expression of divine love.”2 As such, interaction with this world, this given reality, is sacramental, inasmuch as it is a graced reality. For the arts, this demonstrates a truth that reformed thinkers in the Dutch tradition like Begbie and Wolterstorff have been declaring for nearly the past 3 decades, that the experiences of the arts and artistic making are fundamentally “ways we engage the physical world… physical things… [that] have ultimately arisen through the free initiative of God’s love- they are part of the ordo amoris.”
As the church shrunk back from the world, both Catholics and Protestants had difficulty articulating this Christian view on the arts and the world. Begbie points out that the retreat from the physical often took the form of looking for an underlying spiritual value or meaning: “Commonly, the thrust seems to be to look beyond the material sounds to the order or beauty they reflect or point to rather than to welcome them as valuable embodiments of God-given order and beauty in their own right, with their physical character intrinsic to that value.” Later, even the spiritual would lose cred, and the hermeneutic tendency would look for meaning in the individual’s psychological experience of art - think here of those like Clive Bell and Sylvia Plath.
As art become more abstract, so too artists and the public alike more often practiced abstraction in seeking the underlying essence of the artifact from its physical boundaries. Even theologians programmed this dichotomy of the physical from the meaningful and spiritual.3 Yet all of this misses or regrets what is most characteristic of art, that it plays with and in the physical realm, that it is transmitted to us not by spiritual means, but by and through creation: “[B]earing in mind the long-standing legacy of thinking about music … which has arguably suppressed a great deal of music and led to unnecessarily negative attitudes toward it (not least in the church), we might do well to regain a sense of music’s profound physicality - its embeddedness in God’s given material world.” Although Begbie is addressing music in particular here, his argument easily extends to the other arts.
Furthermore, re-situating our relationship to art as physical helps us relearn the physical world in general as well as the human body itself, the last act of the original creation: “Our own bodies… are intrinsically part of musical experience. To insist that Christians are to be spiritual is indeed quite proper, but to be spiritual is not to renounce the body per se.” The acceptance of the body as creation and thus necessarily and constitutively part of this thing we call art has a dual fecundity. First, as it emphasizes not only artistic creation, but rather experience in general as a physical act, it leads us to an intimacy with art we may have hitherto reserved for the artist herself. And second, it explodes the individual nature of art, emphasizing the communal aspect of physicality, the “koinonia” of the created order. Begbie draws on the thought of Bonhoeffer to explicate the image of the Christian community, one not of cheap harmony, but of polyphony, sometimes difficult to grasp, but always rewarding. The emphasis is relatedness being part of the overall aesthetic creation, rather than the Romantic image of the artist as sole-creator in defiance of the heavens and the masses. “True enough, the self is always and already a social product… and yet the self is centered when addressed and treated as a distinct you by another person or other persons… Such is the ecstatic love at the heart of the Triune God in which we are invited to share.”
I would add that it is not only the community of believers or simply humanity that we join when we participate in creation and acknowledge our place within the created order. For, if even the stones would cry out in praise should humanity fall silent (Luke 19), it seems only “natural” that they also welcome our joining in the polyphony of the worldly community. The elements of creation seem to be actively awaiting commune with the other members, a vision that the land artist Andy Goldworthy seems to have focused on with his lens. His work carries a sense not only of an order or form inherent to nature, to physicality,
but also the yearning of the natural for the supernatural koinonia to which Begbie alludes. The question is if and how one might speak of stones and wood and leaves singing in the polyphony.


Nice post, DWM! Thanks so much.
Thanks for the compliment, Janet. I’ve been wanting to get the aesthetics discussion going for a while here on TLOU.
Well put! I like the pictures you chose too, though I am partial to those icicle sculptures.
Just saw the film _Happy Feet_; there’s nothing quite like an ‘eco-musical’ with penguins in Antartica. Do you think the genre of ‘musicals’ is illustrative of the sort of communion btwn. creatures and their ultimate source?
Excellent post, Dan. Now you have convinced me to buy Begbie’s book. I think that Begbie’s work actually complements or could be harmonized with a classico-medieval view of aesthetics. In other words, where the latter (in my opinion) can at times seem to degrade the physical and sensuous, Begbie’s emphasis on music as a physico-spiritual whole is a plus. It always bothers me when I read in Boethius or others of the same stripe that what is most important in music in terms of aesthetics is the proportion relations “behind” the sounds. Begbie helps us to balance this by giving us a picture of music as iconically experienced through and in the sound.
Best wishes,
Cynthia
Very interesting sculptures.
Cynthia, thanks for the kind words. I, too, am interested in similar sytheses of protestant thought on aesthetics, especially those which take impetus from the Dutch (e.g. Rookmaaker, Wolterstorff, Walford, and Begbie), with Catholic tradition and metaphysical thought. I’ve been thinking for a long time about similarities in Balthasar’s ressourcement of the analogia entis (esp. his reflection on the Romantic era in GL 5) and Wolterstorff writing on disinterestedness in Art in Action. So, you can imagine how excited I was by this felicitous turn in Begbie’s work. We’ll see how good the book is re developing the train of thought laid out in his B&C article. I’m proposing it as the next book for my theological aesthetics reading group, so hopefully you and I can have a fruitful discussion about it and your project with medieval and classical aesthetics.
Scott, glad to see your branching out to nature movies and discussing theatre genre. LOL
As far as the genre and medium of musical theatre can illustrate the doctrine of creation, I would wonder if they can any more than any other genre or medium. I don’t think I’m comfortable at this point in privledging any of the arts as more or less able to communicate or illustrate theology. That is to say, I think the entire creation, which if we go with Begbie includes vision and sound - thus all media and genre - is able to illustrate AND participate in the profound relationship between creation and Creator.
Davis, et al.,
If you haven’t seen the excellent film Andy Goldsworthy’s Rivers and Tides: Working With Time, it is an excellent introduction to this incredible artist. His ability to work with natural elements is mysterious and humbling to me.
Now for a boring ontological comment: what is precisely wrong with Beothius’s, or Aquinas’s or Duns Scotus’s distinction btwn. the immaterial soul and the material organic bodily organs? In the end, I wonder whether the frustration with the first two is their principle(s) of individuation of forms. Whereas they would say some property is individual b/c of an individual subject where the ‘universal’ has a foothold in the world, Scotus want to say that even the accident properties are individual, which of course depend on the substance (b/c of inesse). In modern analytic philosophy, this is akin to trope theory, where every property just is individual (not a universal)-even if it is ontologically dependent on a substance/subject: this by the way, is one of the interpretations of Aristotle argued for by some in the 20th c.
Or again, the question is: what is sense knowledge? what is intellectual knowledge? Is the concern that we ought to attribute more or a difference sort of knowledge in sense knowledge? Medievals would think it somewhat obvious that our senses don’t function that way– but perhaps what is wished to be account for is the experience of ‘immediate’ knowledge of some object w/o discursive reasoning? If so, Duns Scotus does elaborate a different sort of cognizing, which is intuitive cognition (w/o concepts). Still, this cognizing is proximately possible b/c of the immaterial human or angelic intellect, not the senses.
Apologies for the typos.. haven’t had coffee yet.
Thanks Dan, I’ll check out his work which is reminiscent of Martin Puryear.