Here’s one to get the thomists out there involved – you know who you are.1 This week, I’ve had the fun task of analyzing Rahner’s and de Lubac’s positions on the beatific vision and Gaudium et Spes, 22. It’s been interesting to gain a deeper understanding the interpretations of how Christ “fully reveals man to man himself…”2
The whole thing goes back further than Aquinas, even to Augustine in passages like his Letters XCII and CXLVII (De Videndo Deo). The following is from Letter XCII.
And we shall become the more like unto Him, the more we advance in knowledge of Him and in love; because “though our outward man perish, our inward man is renewed day by day,”3 yet so as that, however far one may have become advanced in this life, he is far short of that perfection of likeness which is fitted for seeing God, as the apostle says, “face to face.”4
In Aquinas – I’m most familiar with his Summa Contra Gentiles right now – we get the clear statement that the final, or ultimate, end of humans is not natural but supernatural; of course, this is a highly contested point. Whereas Aristotle had defined the end of a nature as that which is proportionate to the nature – for there can be no frustrated nature5 – Aquinas now tells us that the destiny of human nature lies in God.
IF then human happiness does not consist in the knowledge of God whereby He is commonly known by all or most men according to some vague estimate, nor again in the knowledge of God whereby He is known demonstratively in speculative science, nor in the knowledge of God whereby He is known by faith, as has been shown above (Chapp. XXXVIII-XL); if again it is impossible in this life to arrive at a higher knowledge of God so as to know Him in His essence, or to understand other pure spirits, and thereby attain to a nearer knowledge of God (Chapp. XLI-XLVI); and still final happiness must be placed in some knowledge of God (Ch. XXXVII); it follows that it is impossible for the final happiness of man to be in this life.6
Rahner’s entrance to this debate comes through his exposition of the transcendence of being. Whereas Aquinas was preoccupied with explaining the beatific vision by way of Aristotle’s work on the soul and nature, for Rahner the problem had taken on new dimensions in the aftermath of Pius XII’s encyclical supposedly issued in reaction to de Lubac’s Surnaturel. Humani Generis declared that not only could “the intellect … in some way perceive higher goods of the moral order…”7 but fie to them that
hold that the function of these two sciences [theodicy and ethics] is not to prove with certitude anything about God or any other transcendental being, but rather to show that the truths which faith teaches about a personal God and about His precepts, are perfectly consistent with the necessities of life and are therefore to be accepted by all, in order to avoid despair and to attain eternal salvation.8
So, Rahner needed to find a way to connect what was largely perceived to be a gross separation between theology and philosophy, describe the relevant relationship between nature and grace, and do all that without compromising the teaching of the church, the autonomy of nature, and the gratuitousness of grace.
- no, not you scott. You’re “scotian” or “scotusian”↩
- Gaudium et Spes 22↩
- II Cor. 4:6↩
- I Cor. 8:12↩
- Although, Aquinas points out that Aristotle left an opening for what he was now undertaking: “But it may be replied that whereas happiness is the good of an intelligent nature, true and perfect happiness belongs to those in whom intelligent nature is found in its perfection, that is, in pure spirits;but in man it is found imperfectly by way of a limited participation. And this seems to have been the mind of Aristotle: hence, enquiring whether misfortunes take away happiness, after showing that happiness lies in virtuous activities, which are the most permanent things in this life, he concludes that they who enjoy such perfection in this life are ‘happy for men,’ meaning that they do not absolutely attain happiness, but only in a human way.” (Summa Contra Gentiles, III. 48. 8 paragraph 2) ↩
- Summa Contra Gentiles, III. 48. 1↩
- Humani Generis, 33↩
- Humani Generis, 34↩
Is not the essence of the beatific vision simply that we get closer and closer to God throughout eternity without ever completing this vision? That to “see God face to face” is to grow ever further? So even when all other things have been completed (prophecy, wisdom, etc.) there will still be love, and love will never be completed–this is its essence, to grow and fulfill “world without end”. Zizek, in commenting on I Cor. 13 says that Love is “non-all.” As this pertains to the natural/supernatural debate doesn’t this mean that Love shows the lack which determines this life and is the substance of the fullness which has dominion in the next?
If by finality you mean exhaustive knowledge, then yeah, I’d agree with you. But there has to be some finality to it, otherwise, in Augustine’s terminology, we’d be restless for eternity. It’s the difference between the finality of a nature and the finality of a relationship. Our natures qua natures have to have a destiny that they can eventually arrive at.
So maybe Augustine and Thomas (and Dante) have a little different view on this. Its clear in Dante that the journey is endless, and yet even with Augustine it seems like he would want to see that there is always movement in love, and that there is something in God that is always mysterious
DWM says, “otherwise we’d be restless for eternity”. Just FYI, this is precisely Gregory of Nyssa’s position: that on account of the infinite difference b/t creator and creation, there is no limit to the Godward growth of the human creature. Don’t ask me to draw out the implications of that for this discussion. Just saying that it’s a point argued at length in his theology.
Yes, Rahner is driven to reconcile nature and grace, though intrinsically. He sees humanity as intrinsically oriented to God–human nature as a capax Dei, a capacity for God. Thus, the human and the divine are not antithetical. Rather, to be fully human we must share in the divine life. Our end as human beings is the vision of the holy mystery who remains unfathomable and incomprehensible mystery even in the beatific vision. Believing God remains mystery in the BV connects well, I think, to the patristic notion of epektasis (cf. Gregory of Nyssa). This notion says that there is an endless dialectic between desire and fulfillment, i.e., that since God is always greater our desire for God will never conclude. In this respect I appreciate the above mention of Love as “non-all.”
Hi Dan,
A great discussion–as usual.
I tend to favor the Greek Orthodox view (and perhaps this isn’t inconsistent or incompatible with the way that St. Thomas or Augustine view the beatific vision—though it probably depends on what passage one emphasizes in their works and who’s doing the interpreting), viz., the idea that given the distance between Creator and creature—a distance which is not eradicated even when one is divinized—we can never arrive at a full comprehension of God (Thomas would no doubt agree with that claim). Thomas does of course say that our intellects at present cannot achieve beatific vision [the faculty is disproportionate to the “object”, viz., God] and that is in part why we require a supernatural elevation of our intellects for the beatific vision (this by the way is a distinguishing point between Thomas and Scotus). With regard to our restless Augustinian hearts—I can’t imagine that our hearts will be restless in the presence of God and in the absence of sin. If we think of God’s Infinite Love in a positive sense—as superabundance or excess, then I don’t think that we have to import our current restless that seeks a resting place into our experience of the BV as never ending but always increasing—our rest in God would then take on an analogical and not a univocal meaning.
Best wishes,
Cynthia
matslackr: guess you’re writing the post on nyssa for this thread!
thanks for the comment.
LJ: welcome and thanks for the comment. You know I’m interested in continuing to pick your brains on this topic. I think you’ll be interested in how charitable my paper came out for Rahner in the end. I still feel like I’ve barely scratched the surface, and also wish that I had another 2 weeks, rather than 13 hours!
Cynthia, thanks for the clarification. My reading of the passage I quoted from the Summa Contra Gentiles, along with the reading I’ve been doing in de Lubac lately, leads me to a slightly different understanding of Thomas on this issue – I hope to treat de Lubac in length later. That is, rather than a separate moment or event of divinization, de Lubac understands Thomas as positing our supernatural end as happening in the same moment as the very reception of being. So, that would seem to sound more like your reading of the Greek Orthodox view. I’d be interested in hearing more about the G.O. tradition on this one. Maybe from this regard, de Lubac could affirm as you do that there are shades of rest and restless, or that we could understand those analogously. I like that understanding. Thanks!
I have a hard time thinking that Aquinas denies ‘direct’ and in turn, ‘complete’ knowledge of God in the beatific vision. Otherwise, in medieval terms you posit an intelligible species by means of which the blessed in heaven would cognize God, and this Aquinas, and Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus all reject. B/c an intelligible species (what we can here call a created concept however complex). Knowledge of God for the blessed, these all agree, has no mediation aside from Godself. So then, it is just a matter of ‘what is seen in God’. Certainly the three persons and attributes ‘as they are in God’.
Also, the comment about love seems to presuppose an account of human cognition in this life, which given what I’ve reported about about the cognition of the blessed, does not apply to them. Love loves more, when it desire more knowledge which it does not presently have. So, if God is fully present to the blessed in heaven, then the object known is fully present and thus love can be fully satisfied. In other words, in this life we can always learn more by the very definition of how cognition in this life happens, namely, by a series of concepts added and divided (discursive reasoning) together. But in heaven, we will not have a ‘formable’ structure of concepts, rather, given that God is pure act, our cognition of God will be ‘pure act’ and thus will not have the feature of ‘being formable’ after cognizing God by Godself (and not by some concept).
Again, Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus all agree on everything I’ve said above. There are various details to add on, but the crucial point that there is no (created) concepts by means of which we cognize God (as regards the beatific vision).
He sees humanity as intrinsically oriented to God–human nature as a capax Dei, a capacity for God. Thus, the human and the divine are not antithetical. Rather, to be fully human we must share in the divine life.
Rahner does view human beings as intrinsically oriented to God, but he views this capacity as already, in itself, ‘supernatural’. Thus whilst it is the case that ‘pure nature’ has never existed, the concept is still retained as a formal distinction in order to preserve the gratuity of grace (one of the major concerns of Humani Generis). This is one principle difference between Rahner and de Lubac on the grace/nature question. As DWM remarks above de Lubac was inclined to view humanity’s desire for God as already given with his creation and so did not retain the notion of ‘pure nature’ even as a “remainder concept”. He therefore speaks of a ‘double-gift’ in the single act of creation.
I don’t, however, read into this distinction between the two the sort of grave consequences that someone like John Milbank does. Rahner’s human being (as he has always and everywhere existed) has God’s offer of himself as a constitutive aspect of his being. I don’t think there’s anything particularly ‘secularizing’ about that.
Scott, I’m not sure what you’re responding to. I agree, however in that I don’t think Aquinas denies direct knowledge of God; it’s just not possible in this life. Hence: “if again it is impossible in this life to arrive at a higher knowledge of God so as to know Him in His essence, or to understand other pure spirits, and thereby attain to a nearer knowledge of God (Chapp. XLI-XLVI); and still final happiness must be placed in some knowledge of God (Ch. XXXVII); it follows that it is impossible for the final happiness of man to be in this life.”
Re: love, love can be understood as not only the action by which one “loves” something or someone. However, it can also be that which funds being. This is especially prominent in de Lubac and Balthasar, but they argue pretty tenaciously that this comes from Aquinas. I’ll have to get back to you on that.
Re: the love question. If by ‘love funds being’ is meant, it is by God’s love that creatures came-into-existence, then that is certainly Aquinas and so many others’ view. This seems somewhat trivial. What seems untrivial is whether and how you construe the description of an act of will that is love. This gets to your inquiry into necessity and contingency. It seems from Thomas’ point of view, it is explained by ‘necessity from hypothesis’. In other words, if God wanted to make this creature and that creature, there are certain features God would need to create if He were to create this and that creature. The contingency comes in at the beginning when God chooses to create or not create this or that creature, but once God chooses to do that, then certain features necessarily follow (e.g. if Paul is to be Paul, God will create him at a certain time, place, with certain bodily features, etc.). Aquinas, as you probably know, uses this necessity from hypothesis argument to explain the incarnation as well.
Yes, but he does not use this hypothesis to describe human nature. Only the incarnation.
Regarding love as the reason, I’m not sure what you mean by this being trivial. God creating out of love is a far cry from God creating by emanation, etc… any other operative reason. Love certainly doesn’t seem trivial to me.
Further, Balthasar’s and Lubac’s Love is not only a reason for creating, but an operative principle. It undergirds the creation, and is the mode of trinitarian relations. Read Adrian Walker’s article on Love Alone for more on this. He takes 20 pages of almost entirely footnotes to explain this, so I won’t attempt to do so here in this thread.
Ok, I’ll have a look there when I can.
I said ‘trivial’ in the sense that ‘of course’ love is the peculiar creative act by which God creates creatures. But what is a less obvious issue is how to construe the freedom and/or necessity of this creative act. To say ‘love’ explains God’s creative act (epistemological description) piggybacks on love as a productive principle (ontological description). Not to be picky, but the creative act couldn’t be an operation otherwise there would be no product which is the term of the act, it has to be a productive act where there is some real product outside the agent doing the (productive) act.
I’m uncertain about what you mean by saying love is the ‘mode of trinitarian relations’. I won’t bore you with all the medieval technique for this stuff; you may like to look at Gilles Emery’s ‘Trinity, Church and the Person’ or somesuch title. Chapter 4 is a decent exposition on the unique roles the divine persons play toward creatures; although I found bits in the previous chapter confusing and unhelpful as he seems to overlook the important work of Russell Friedman on the topic of the appropriation of philosophical psychology by Aquinas and co. Still, I think ch. 4 has some worthy points to make insofar as Emery identifies certain hazards when talking about ‘unique roles’ of the divine persons in acting toward/among creatures.
Scott, all I’ll suggest is that you read Walker’s article in Communio on Balthasar’s ontology of Love. It might be helpful to see the ways in which Aquinas is being dialog’d with in modern theology rather than medieval studies.